H. William Nalder, Catherine Nalder and H. William Nalder, Jr. v. Kellogg Sales Company : Answer to Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1955
H. William Nalder, Catherine Nalder and H.
William Nalder, Jr. v. Kellogg Sales Company :
Answer to Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Albert R. Bowen; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
This Response to Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Rehearing, Nalder v. Kellogg Sales Co., No. 8313 (Utah Supreme Court, 1955).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2348
\ 
J 
IN THE SUPREME . COURT=r D· . 
of the f 2 ·. ~ 
STATE OF UTAH .c 2 r~ 1955 
--·------·_.,._ .......... - ... -.r 
::.~~;~~ s-~~~ .. ~.;:).~te ~OLtrt, Utah 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, CATHERINE 
NALDER AND H. WILLIAM NALDER, 
JR., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
Case 
No. 8313 
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
and ALBERT R. BOWEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, CATHERINE 
NALDER AND H. WILLIAM NALDER, 
JR., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case 
No. 8313 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
In their petition for rehearing respondents com-
plain of this court's ruling that when penalties of differing 
severity may possibly be applied only the least or lesser 
penalty provided by law will be given application. While 
respondents challenge the correctness of such ruling they 
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confess their inability to cite any authority in support of 
their position. 
All damages assessed by the lower court in excess of 
actual damages were true penalties and being punitive in 
their nature they are clearly akin to penalties imposed for 
the violation of criminal statutes or ordinances. 
The cases hold, in harmony with this court's decision, 
that when there is uncertainty or doubt as to which of 
two penalties may be imposed the accused is entitled to the 
imposition of the lesser penalty. 
In People v. Hoaglin, 247 N. W. 141, 144, the Su-
preme Court of Michigan held that: 
uif any uncertainty develops as to which penal 
clause is applicable, the accused is entitled to have 
the lesser of two penal ties administered." 
See also, People v. Lockhart, 219 N. W. 724. 
The Michigan cases and the decision of this court are 
in harmony with each other and with the accepted legal 
philosophy that statutes prescribing penalties are strictly 
construed in favor of persons accused of violation. 
Except for the foregoing all matters referred to in 
respondents' petition were fully covered by the briefs and 
oral argument. 
The petition for rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
and ALBERT R. BOWEN 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
State of Utah, 
· Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLARENCE E. BRIDGE, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL 
Oase No. 8314 
STATB~fE~T OF FACTS 
DEFENDANT \Yas charged with the crime of 
robbery, to-wit: on or about the 19th day of April,. 
1 D;-)4, robbing one Edna Brennan in her residence l,ocated 
at 23 ~ orth 1st \V(•st, Salt Lake Cit~·, State of Ut~ah . 
.:\eromplices mimed in the complaint were Herbert 
Schlos·ser and :\f•ilton B. Head, the former having pleaded 
"guilty" to the charge and the latter ha ,·ing been con-
Yicted after a trial by jur.'·· 
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On the 28th day of October, 1954, the defendant 
was placed on trial in the Third Judicial District Court 
' Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Clarence 
E. Baker presiding. From his conviction hy the jury 
and the imposed sentence this 'appeal is taken. Discussion 
of the evidence so far as it relate,;; to the questions whi<'h 
this appeal raises will be n1ade as the various matters 
upon which appellant relies are discussed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The argument in this case will rollow the point 
below given: 
POINT J. 
That the Oourt below committeed error in denying 
defendan1ts objection to the introduction of a confession 
made by defendant to the Salt Lake City police, sub-
sequent to his arrest and while being held in the Salt 
Lake City jail (Tr. 15), and, that this error is inevHably 
linked ·with the trial courts subsequent refusal to grant 
defendants motion for dismis'sal (Tr. 39) on the grounds 
of denial of counsel and on the related grounds of the 
use of uncorroborated testimony of an ac0omplice on 
which to sustain a conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
''That the Court below committed error in denying 
defendants qbjection to the introduction of a confession 
made by defendant to the Salt Lake Cit~' police, sub-
sequent to his arrest and while being held in the Salt 
Lake City jail (Tr. 15), and, that this error is inevitably 
linked with the trial courts subsequent refusal to grant 
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def~ndants motion for dismissal (Tr. 39) on the grounds 
of denial of -counsel and on the related grounds of the 
use of ~ncorroborated testimony of an aceomplice on 
which to sustain a convietion. '' 
It is the contention of defendant that Se-ction 77-31-
18, Utah Code Ann. (1953), which is the general statute 
as to testimony of accO'mplices and the nee~ f,or corrobora-
tion of such testimony in order to support a conviction 
is applicable in the instant case. 
An examination of the testimony of four of the 
State's five witnesses eonclusively establishes their indi-
vidual and collective inability to place the defendant at 
or even near the s·cene of the crime. 
( 1) The victim, ~1rs. Edna Brennan, wrus asked 
by the District Attorney, (Tr. 9) 
"Did you see Mr. Bridge in your apartment 
the night this happened~'' 
''No sir, I did not." 
(2) }f r. McDonough, neighbor and friend of the 
victim, w.ho came upon the sce:ne while the r·obbery was 
in progress, was asked on cross-examination, (Tr. 12) 
"Mr. McDonough, on the night of this event 
you have just talked about, did you see the defend-
ant?'' 
'' \Vho do you mean, please?'' 
''Stand up." (indicates defendant) 
'' Oh, Mr. Bridge, no sir.'' 
''You didn't see that man~'' 
"No sir." 
(3) Salt Lake Police Officer Dean Anderson merely 
testified ahout finding a box allegedly containing certain 
property stolen from Yl n.;. Edna Brennan and, in hi~ 
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testimony, did not even attempt to p1ace the defendant at 
or near the scene of the crime. ( Tr. 23) 
(4) .Salt Lake Police Officer Don PParson, who 
investigated the robbery, was not able to place the 
"defendant at or near the scene ·of the crime except b)' 
reference t·o the ·statement made by the defendant and to 
the introduction of which and the use of which as cor-
roborating evidence (as well as the methods employed 
in obtaining same), defense counsel interposed an objec-
tion, the denial of which forms the basis of this appeal. 
(Tr. 15) (Tr. 39) 
As a matter. of record, the accomplice, Milton B. 
Head, who was convicted for his participation in the 
crime at an earlier trial, was the only prosecution witness 
who was able to place the defendant at or ne·ar the scene 
of-the crime and to otherwise implicate him with partici-
pation therein, and to the testimony of this witness 
defense eounsel also interposed objections. (Tr. 24) (Tr. 
- 38) (Tr. 39) 
It would appear beyond any shade of rebuttal that 
the only corroborating evidence to the tHstimony of the 
· witness, J\1ilton B. Head, was the confession or signed 
statement of the defendant. Accordingly, it seems appar-
ent that, if the' signed statement of the defendant was 
inadmis'Sable, as urged by the defendant, then the requi-
sites of Section 77-31-18, Utah Code Ann. (1953) were 
not met and the conviction cannot stand. 
In support of this contention, defendant urges upon 
this Court that the constitutional factors herein involved 
are determirtative, since, in essence, the admissabilit~· 
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or non-admissability of defendant's statement depends {)n 
constitutional interpretations and the practical applica-
tion thereof, to-wit: was the "taking" of such a state-
ment or confession by a police officer tantamount to a 
denial of the rights of due process guaranteed by the 
'Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution 
of the United States when such "taking" diametrically 
ignored and was in the face of the defendants repeated 
requests for legal counsel before making any statements. 
It is on this question and the related question of the 
practical use made at the trial of such a signed statement 
that defendants appeal is predicated. 
Article 1, Section 12, Constitution ·of Utah provides: 
''In criminal prosecuti-ons the accused shall 
have the right to appe,ar and defend in person 
and by counsel ... In no instance shall any a·ccused 
person before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the right here-
in guaranteed ... " · 
The Statutes of F tah have extended the eonsti-
tnticna1 guarantees implied and expressed in the above-
quoted portions hy' providing, in Section 77-15-1, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953): 
"\Vhen the defendant is brought before the 
magistrate upon an arrest ... the magistrate must 
immediately inform him of the charg-e against 
him and of his right to the aid of counsel in eve,ry 
slrtpe of the proceedings." (Italics added) 
\''.'hile it ma~' he contended that the wonls of the 
Statute, as quo tell above, ''every· stage of the proceed-
in~·~,'' ~hould be judicially interpreted in their narrow-
est ~en,:e as applving only to formal court proceedings, 
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such all intepretation, if su~ported by thi>< Court, would ~ 
achieve only the questionable and undesirable result of 
frustating and denying the Yery purposes of com;;ti-. { 
tution~l and statutory guarantees for all the people and 
would- set a penalty on ignorance and poverty and 
suspicion. Can it rightly be 'maintained that procedural 
due process is merely a pretty catch-word like a flowt>r 
which- is exp~cted to nurture and grow on a rockbed of • 
inquisition, coercion and pressure~ If its foundation 
·i 
-is- rotten,· must not the house itself soon fall~ If the 
prisoner accused of a crime· is subjected to the infamies 
of physical and mental torture, of solitary confinement, 
of protracted ques-tioning • and cross-questi'oning, of soft-
spoken. promises to "go easy" and "cooperation," then 
do~s~ not. the-later observance of eonsti tu tional niceties at 
for!llar -court· pr·oceedings, where statements obtained 
'Yithnut _e':'ep. __ a mip.imum regard for legal standards of 
decency:'and fairplay-are introduced, become_in reality a 
_mer~-mockery of those guarantees neatly ea1culated to 
_mask the earlier disregard for fundamental rights~ 
. The attention of the Court is respectfully invited 
to the testimony of police officers Pearson, on cross-
:examination, {Tr. 17-22, incl.) In this exchange between 
·the~ Witl1ess ana: defense counsel is s·et forth the whole 
sordl{f s±or}/u( a- "polic~ po\ver" (and the exercise 
ther~of-) -~~'lli~h :offends every cannon of decency and 
f~irplay, and which certainly is considera:bly outside of 
t_he a-rea of contemplation of the authors of the Statutes 
ai1d Constitution- of- the ·state of Utah and the Nation. 
"Uere js· the frank revelation, not unaccompanied with 
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a certain degree of cynicism in the witnesseS; references 
to "feeding time at the jail" and "time for me to go 
off shift,'' of a young, inexperienced, poor, and hopeless 
boy beilig questioned, questioned, and again questioned 
about a serious crime-of repeated requests for_ legal 
·counsel - of empty and vapid agreement with the 
prisoners. requests by the police officer but without a · 
single effort to do something in compliance - of an 
inevitable "breaking" by the prisoner and the "taking'' 
of a confession which eventually became the· one single 
piece _of corroborating evidence which convicted the 
defendant. 
And it is just this situation, as revealed by the testi-
mony of the prosecution witness which affords this Court 
a golden opportunity_ to judicially uphold and re-affirm 
its adherence to constitutional guarantees without which 
this State and this Nation cannot long hope to survive. 
Here are the crossroads where a clear cut and unimpeach- · 
able de<::ision must be reached, regardless of the ~ilt 
or innocence of the individual who-se particular prohleJ!l 
happens to be the medium b_y which the question 'has come 
before this Court. Here is a parallel to the verysituation 
which g·ave birth to those memorable lines written ·by 
~Ir. J usti~e Frankfurter in SACHER vs. UNITED 
STATES, 343 e.s. 1 -(1953): 
'' ... Bitfer experience has sharpened our 
realization that ·a major test of a true democracy 
is the fair administration of justice ... Time out 
of mind this Court has rever'sed conviCJtion for 
the most heinous offenses, even though no doubt 
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about the guilt of the ·defendants was enter-
tained. It reversed because the mode by which 
guilt was established disregarded those standards 
which are so p1recious and so improtant to our 
society." (Italics added) 
'The ·defendant urges upon the Court an acceptance 
of a memorandum which was submitted to the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives of the 
Congress of the United States by a Committee on the 
Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association which, 
in part, stated: 
''A person accused of crime needs a lawyer . 
right after his arrest more than at any other time 
. . . investigation is made easier if the prisoner 
is hidden away from lawyers who might advise 
him of his rights with respect to interrog.ations 
and confessions ... " (Italics added) 
Reference is also n1ade to a comment by Dean Justin 
Miller, (Duke University School of Law) one of the fore-
m'Ost authorities in the field of criminal law, published in 
the 20th Volume of the American Bar Association 
Journal, page 77 ( 1934) : 
" ... although 0ompetent counsel is of great 
value at that time (time oftrial), the time when 
an accused person really needs the help of a 
lawyer is when he is first arrested and fr()m then 
on until trial. The intervening period is so full 
of hazards for the accused person that he may . 
have lost any legitimate defens~ long ,before he 
is arranged and put on trial.'' (Italics added) 
The defendant submits to the Court that, the formal 
wording of the Utah Constitution and its Statutes not-
withstanding, he was denied effective counsel at the trial 
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because of the events which preceded that trial. By 
the time the trial stage wa;s reached the damage had 
been done and no attorney, no matter how skilled, 
could have overeome that damage. The confession of 
the defendant. was obtained without the knowledg.e on 
his part that it, as a single entity, would be the corro-
borating evidence necessary to convict him, a danger 
which proper legal counsel, immediately after his arrest, 
would have been able to bring to his attention after the 
briefest discussion of the facts surrounding the com-
mission of the crime. It would appear that this fact, 
standing alone, would be more than sufficient to meet 
the possible argument that a deprivation of due process, 
in order to become the basis of appellate review, must 
he seriously prejudicial to an appellant· in orde·r to 
bring about a reversal. It is, however, submitted to 
the Court that no such minute inspection of the degree 
of prejudice arising from a denial of due prece·ss is 
necessarv. In the words of l\Ir. Justice Murphy, speaking 
in GL.\~SER vs. UXITED RTATES, 315 U.S. 60 (1942): 
''To determine the precise degree of pre.-
judice ... is . :. difficult and unnecessary. Tlu' 
ri,qltt to li(we assistance of counsel is too funda-
mental and absol1de to allow cowrts to indulge in 
nice crtlc1dations as to the amount of prejudice 
arising from its denial" ( Itralics added) 
In -thP instant cac.:e there w<Jnld appear to be little 
rpJP;-;tion as to the degree of_ material prejudi('P. suffered 
by the defendant as- the result of the police officer's 
tacit or impl;e(l refusal to take s_ome affirmative step 
calcnlatwl to provide ('Ollll''el for:~the defendant, after 
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-
the latters many requests, before continuing with the 
questioning. The record of ·the trial provides ample proof 
that a tired and worn out youngster, after having his 
repeated requests for legal representation effectually 1 
denied by his ques'tioners, finally broke down and said 
(Tr. 19): 
"Oh, 1 will give it to you, I guess it doesn't 
make any difference.'' 
In that short, simple statement, this Court is pre-
sented with a graphic picture of what denial of counsel J 
''at every stage of the proceedings,'' as set forth in the 
S1tatutes of Utah, really means. Surely it must pave ,
1 
·been just such a realization which prompted Mr. Justice ~ 
Frankfurter, in. POWELL vs. ALABAMA, 287 U.S. 45 .;1 
(1932) to write: 
. '' ... he requires the guiding hand of counsel .,. 1 
at every step in the proceedings against him.'' · 
It will presumably be argu·ed that the safeguards 
to human liberty enco·mpassed ~n the 14th ~mendment 
to the Oonsti'tution of the United States are merely" gen-
eralities" established by the Congress of the "guidance" 
1 
of the several States and that the scope of interpretation 
and application thereof by the individual State courts 
is within the provi_nce of local .sovereignty. While th:re 4 
unquestionably exists a certain degree of foundatwn ~· 
for such a viewpoint, it ·would nevertheless appear that 
the 14th Amendment imposes upon each State a duty to 
follow its legislative, constitutional and statutory policy, 
as set forth i~ its par'ticular laws and rules of procedure. 
Within this category should lie the ·right of a prisoner to 
have his requests for counsel honored-~---not after a case 
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has been built up against him, but, as the Uta:h Statutes 
require, at every stage of the proceedings, whic:h should 
certainly include the interrogation stage. Any other 
policy will inevitably lead to the very type ·of situation 
which is before this Oourt now, where denial of counsel 
has resulted in a prejudicial statement being taken from 
a prisoner who was not made fully aware of its import 
-and the use to which it would subsequently be put. For 
this Court to subscribe to any other viewpoint would, 
in effect, be to sanction an abridgement of its own stand-
ards of due process of law, as 'set forth in its own 
Statutes and in complian~e with its own constitutional 
requisites. It is respectfully submitted to the Court that, 
"'hile the provisions of the 14th Amendment to the Con-
~titution of the Fnited States may be generalities, they 
are nevertheless armed wi'~~h the authority and dignity 
of purpose which demand adherence from the several 
States. As to the applicability of those provisions to 
the particular pro,blem presented by this appeal, e.i., a 
denial of counsel by local police officials at the interro-
gation stage, the words of Judge Rutledge (later on the 
henc:h of the Supreme Court of the United States), in his 
cleci~ion froTYJ the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia in \YOOD vs. UNITED STATES, 128 Fed. 2d, 
~G5 (1942) ~aid: · 
'' ... the aid of counsel in preparation would 
be farcical if the case could be fo,reclosed by pre-
! imina 1',1/ inquisition 1d1ich 1Nmld squeeze out con-
riction or prejudice lJ.lJ means unconstitutional, if 
used at the trial ... tlw better and fairer practice 
would be to provide eounsel for the accused before 
permitting- him to speal even as a volunteer.'' 
(Italics added) 
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It must necessarily be reiterated here that tlw 
Statutes of Utah stand squa.rely behind the words of 
Mr. Justice Sutherland and l\I r. Justice Rutledge !"ill<'<' 
Section 77-15-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953) specifically 
refers to, 
" ... defendants rigbt to the aid of counsrl 11 
at every stage of the proceedings." (I tal irs 
added) 
CONCLUSION 
In view o.f 'the provisions of the 14th Amendment 
to the ·constitution of the United States, the provisi·ons 
of Article ·1, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah, and the prnvisions of Secti·on 77-15-1, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953), the appellant submits to the Court 
'that the taking of his confession, despite his repeated 
requests f.or legal counsel before making ·such a statP-
ment, \vas a prejudicial violation of his rights to the 
due proce-ss of law and that such a statement ;;.;hould 
therefore not have been ·aceepted a:-: evidence hy thr Trial ,. ~ 
Court. If this be so, as· appellant contends, then, under ·~;: 
the provisions of Section 77-31-18 Ptah Code Ann. (1953), · 
the statutory requisites of nroper corroboration for th<> 
evidence given against a defendant hy an arromplicP 
were not met, and his conviction ·should he reverse(]. 
respectfully suhmitten, 
HERBERT TC. RLO~\XE 
Attorney for Defendant. 
65 East 4th South 
Salt Lake Cit~', Ftah 
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